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Reflections on the Economic Future of

Hong Kong
Ted Hagelin'
ABSTRACT

This Article assesses the economic future of Hong Kong after
reunification with China. After reviewing Hong Kong's economic
history, this Article discusses Hong Kong's present economic
situation, and both the positive and negative influences on its
economic future. The author identifies China'sself-interest in Hong
Kong's continued economic prosperity as a positivefactorfor Hong
Kong's economy. China's self-interest stems largely from the
recognition that Hong Kong's economic failure will impact China's
politics, economics, and foreign relations. Negative developments

within China, however, could lead to a precipitous downturn in
Hong Kong's economy. Negative developments include potential
military and political crises, government corruption, and further
deterioration of U.S.-China relations. The article concludes,
however, that Hong Kong continues to offer a highly favorable
business environmentfor internationalinvestors, especiallyfor U.S.
businesses. Furthermore,Hong Kong will continue to offer a more
stable investment environment than many other countries in Asia,
Latin America, and EasternEurope.
Mahjiupaau. Mouhjiu tuh.
The horses will go on running.
The dancing will continue.
Deng Xiaoping's Pledge, in Cantonese,
to the People of Hong Kong'

*Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. Director, Syracuse
University Technology Transfer Research Center; Director, Syracuse University
Hong Kong Law Program. The author would like to thank Ronile Lawrence, Esq.,
Assistant Director of the Syracuse University, Hong Kong Law Program, and Mr.
Michael Herrman, third year law student at Syracuse University, for their
assistance with this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The reunification of Hong Kong, one of the world's premier
free market economies, with the People's Republic of China
(hereinafter P.R.C.), one of the world's last remaining communist
states, is an unprecedented political feat. Never before has a
communist country attempted to absorb an autonomous, fully
developed capitalist economy.
Change of this magnitude
inevitably creates great uncertainty. Every step is a first step,
sometimes forward and sometimes backward. The three areas of
uncertainty that have preoccupied observers of Hong Kong are
politics, economics, and the relationship between the two. 2 Other

2.

See, e.g., John H. Henderson, Note, The Reintegration ofHong Kong into

the People'sRepublic of China: Wat It Means to Hong Kong's FutureProsperity, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 503 (1995); Donna Deese Skeen, Comment, Can Capitalism
Survive under Communist Rule? The Effect of Hong Kong's Reversion to the
People'sRepublic of China in 1997, 29 IDr'L LAw. 175 (1995); ElIzabeth A.R. Yee,
Comment, Hong Kong and China in 1997: An Examination of Possible Legal and
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contributors to this symposium have considered the possible
political consequences of Hong Kong's reunification. This Article
will focus on the realm of economics and will comment on the
state of other institutions only as they impact Hong Kong's
economy.
The economic consequences of reunification for Hong Kong
are a matter of great concern for investors around the globe, but
especially for those in the United States. The United States is
3
Hong Kong's second largest trading partner after China.
Additionally, Hong Kong is currently the world's eighth largest
4
trading economy and tenth most important exporter of services.
Hong Kong imported fifteen billion dollars worth of goods from the
United States in 1995, representing an increase of nearly thirty
percent over 1994.5 The United States is the second largest
investor in manufacturing in Hong Kong, with eighty-eight
factories, over eighteen thousand workers, and $2.6 billion in

sales in 1995.6 Hong Kong is also vitally important to U.S. transPacific trade, which totalled $409 billion in 1994, more than fifty
percent greater than U.S. trans-Atlantic trade. 7 Finally, Hong
Kong is a major gateway for U.S.-China trade, with forty-two
percent of U.S. exports to China and sixty percent of U.S. imports
from China passing through Hong Kong.8
This Article attempts to gauge the economic future of Hong
Kong. Many disparate factors serve to shape a country's economy
and direct its future course. These factors, which span the
realms of military, political, legal, economic, and foreign policy
affairs, are carefully assessed by investors to determine the
aggregate risk exposure associated with an investment in a given
country. 9 Investor assessment of these environmental risks then
determines the minimum level of financial return required on an
investment in one country as opposed to another.' 0 Although
these risks are often amorphous and difficult to quantify,
international financial markets reduce these risks to a very
Economic Implicationsfor United States Businesses, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 595

(1996).
3.
HONG KONG GoVT INFO. SERvs. HONG KONG: OPPORruNTY AsIA 6 (1996)
[hereinafter HONG KONG: OPPORTUNTY ASIA].

4.

Id.at 1.

5.

HONG KONG GoV'T TRADE DEP'T, THE UNITED STATES AND HONG KONG:

SOME IMPORTANT FACTS (1996) [hereinafter U.S. AND HONG KONG: SOME IMPORTANT
FACTS].

6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.

9.

See DAVID G. LETHBRIDGE & NG SEK HONG, THE BUSINESS ENVIRoNMENT IN

HONG KONG 148-54 (3d ed. 1995). For background on differences in opinion on

some of the matters, see Vkram Khanna, Hong Kong's New Era... and How it
Will Unfold From Here, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), June 30, 1997. at 2.

10.

See PAUL ANTHONY SAMUELSON, ECONOmcS 622-23 (10th ed. 1976).
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Ultimately, the greater the risk, the

greater the return required by investors and the higher the cost of
capital to a country. Today, countries around the world compete
for international investment funds. Those countries which can
provide low risk, stable investment environments will attract more
international capital at a reduced capital cost. This is the context
in which this Article examines Hong Kong's economy.
Recognizing the hazards of prediction and following
Shakespeare's prescription that the past is prologue to the future,
this Article first briefly reviews Hong Kong's economic history and
current economic circumstances. It then considers the positive
and negative influences on Hong Kong's economy.
This
discussion is organized around a number of different
environmental influences, which are likely to contribute positively
to Hong Kong's future economic growth. Then, the Article reviews
some particular events, which the author believes could have a
negative impact on growth. This discussion covers an array of

concerns raised in the context of the unique tripartite relationship
that exists among the United States, Hong Kong, and China, as
well as by the relationship among the United States, Taiwan,
Japan, and South Korea.
The overall balance of these circumstances points to a highly
favorable investment climate in Hong Kong for years to come, but
there are events that could cause a precipitous downturn in the
Hong Kong economy. The United States has an important role to
play in encouraging stability and growth in Hong Kong, and in
Southern China generally. The prime beneficiaries of a carefully
crafted U.S. trade policy for the region would be U.S. businesses,
especially small and medium-sized companies.
II. HONG KONG'S ECONOMY: PAST AND PRESENT

Signs of prosperity abound in Hong Kong from the number of
Rolls-Royces and exclusive shops to highrise office buildings and
never-ceasing harbor reclamation projects. First-time visitors to
Hong Kong often compare it to New York City, and there is a
striking similarity between the Hong Kong Island skyline viewed
from the Tsim Sha Tsui promenade and the Manhattan skyline
viewed from the Brooklyn Heights promenade. Closer inspection,
however, reveals an important difference between the two
metropolises. Unlike that of Manhattan, the Hong Kong skyline Is
composed of ultra-modem buildings, few over twenty years old.
The modernity of Hong Kong, reflected also in its transportation
systems and public facilities, reminds one that Hong Kong's
prosperity is of relatively recent origin.

1997]

HONG KONG'S ECONOMICFUTURE

A. Early Economy

During the millennia of governance by Imperial China, Hong
Kong was primarily a fishing village with a subsistence
economy. 1 A rocky island with steep hills, Hong Kong was
merely one of hundreds of other islands scattered throughout the
Pearl River estuary and was considered of little importance to
China or to foreign explorers of the time. Hong Kong was either
omitted or unrecognizable on Chinese maps of the Ch'ing period
(1644-1911) and did not appear on any maritime charts until
1760.12 The Portuguese, who were the first European explorers in
the region in the sixteenth century, chose the Macao peninsula,
on the other side of the Pearl River delta, over Hong Kong as a
settlement site. Hong Kong, however, did offer foreign travelers a
safe port while waiting for the annual change in the prevailing
winds in the South China Sea, but only .at the risk of attack by
the numerous pirates who also took shelter in the many coves
13
and bays of the Pearl River estuary.
The great commercial center of Southern China at that time,
and the principal destination of foreign traders, was Canton.
Situated at the headwaters of the Pearl River some seventy miles
upstream from Hong Kong, Canton was the gateway to mainland
China. Foreign trade through Canton in 1831 was estimated to
be nearly $50 million, with opium by far the largest foreign
import, and tea and silk the largest foreign exports. 14 The ceding
of Hong Kong to Britain in 1842, followed by the ceding of the
Kowloon Peninsula in 1860, and the ninety-nine year lease of the
New Territories in 1898 were the result of Britain's insistence
upon free trade in opium backed by overwhelming military force.
Hong Kong's economy expanded during the early colonial
period, but was still primarily dependent upon the opium trade
with mainland China.15 This was the era of the great British
trading hongs fictionalized in James Clavell's novels. 16 The two
largest of the original hongs were Jardine Matheson and its arch

11.
In an account of an early discussion regarding Hong Kong held in the
Grand Council of China in Peking circa 1843, Hong Kong is referred to as a
barren, isolated island which provided a lair for pirates, but is otherwise
uninhabited except for a few dozen scattered families of poor fishing folk. See
FRANK WELSH, A BoRRowED PLAcE: THE HISrORY OF HONG KONG 11-13 (1993).

12.
13.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 11-13.

14.

I& at 47.

15.
Trade in opium was not, in fact, banned in Hong Kong until the
conclusion of World War II. Id. at 364.
16.

(1966).

See JAMES CLAvELL. NOBLE HOUSE (1981); JAMES CiAVELL, TAI-PAN
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rival, Dent's. 17 Over time, the hongs expanded the scope of
trading activities beyond opium (although Jardine Matheson to
this day uses the poppy flower as its corporate logo) and
developed extensive docks and warehouses on the Hong Kong
Island side of what had become Victoria Harbor. All in all,
however, the first hundred years of British rule of Hong Kong saw
only modest economic growth based almost entirely on shipping
and trade, as well as smuggling.
B. Economic Expansion

The first stimulus to a manufacturing economy in Hong Kong
came during the 1950s when Hong Kong's role as a trade entrepot
for southern China was suddenly terminated by a United Nations
declared blockade of China.' 8
Hong Kong's fledgling
manufacturing industries, many led by immigrant Shanghai
businessmen, 19 grew throughout the 1950s, primarily producing
inexpensive toys, textiles, and low-end electronic products. The
Vietnam War gave further impetus to Hong Kong's expanding
manufacturing base through the 1960s. However, it was not
foreign events, but social chaos in China, that irrevocably altered
20
the course of Hong Kong's economic future.
During China's Cultural Revolution (roughly 1963-1976),
millions of mainland Chinese fled to Hong Kong to escape the
ravages of anarchy and economic deprivation. 2 '
The new
immigrants gave Hong Kong an abundance of low-wage labor,
which quickly attracted foreign investment in a variety of new
manufacturing plants. Although relatively low skilled, Hong
Kong's immigrant labor pool possessed a boundless determination
to succeed, and the discipline and dedication necessary to master
new skills.

17.
18.

WELSH, supra note 11, at 52.
See MICHAELJ. ENRIGHT ETAL., THE HONG KONG ADVANTAGE 5 (1997).

19.

See MADE BY HONG KONG 16-17 (Suzanne Berger & Richard Lester eds.,

1997).

20.
For a discussion of Hong Kong's historical development, see YIN-PING
Ho, TRADE, INDUSTRIAL RESiRUCTURING AND DEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG 1-16
(1992). For a discussion of the changes produced by the renewal of relations
between Hong Kong and Guangdong in 1979, see THE HONG KoNG-GUANGDONG
LINIc PARTNERSHIP INFLux 49-59 (Reginald Kwok & Alvin So eds., 1995).
21.
For a discussion of Hong Kong's historical development, see Ho, supra
note 20, at 1-16. For a discussion of the changes produced by the renewal of
relations between Hong Kong and Guangdong in 1979, see THE HONG KONGGUANGDONG LINic, supra note 20, at 49-59.
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It was during the decade of the 1980s that Hong Kong's
economy finally reached its full potential. 2 2 This growth was
fueled not only by the maturation of Hong Kong's labor force and
economic institutions, but also by changes across the border in
China. With the ascension of Deng Xiaoping in 1979, China
embarked on a series of radical economic reforms. Foremost
among these reforms was the establishment of "special economic
zones" (hereinafter SEZs), which were to operate as free trade
centers to attract foreign investment and technology. Shenzhen,
across the border from the New Territories and a less than an
hour train ride from Kowloon, was designated by Deng as the first
of the SEZs. The impact on Hong Kong was immediate.
Shenzhen offered a new, low-wage labor pool, inexpensive land,
and substantial tax advantages. Investors in Hong Kong quickly
began moving their manufacturing operations to Shenzhen, and
Hong Kong began the transition to a service-based economy,
providing financial, legal, and managerial support for the new

manufacturing enterprises. 23

C. Hong Kong Today

Hong Kong has emerged from a "barren island" a hundred
years ago, to one of the world's foremost commercial centers. The
influence of Hong Kong's global economy reaches far beyond Hong
Kong's tiny geographical bounds, relatively small population, and
limited natural resources. 2 4 By 1996, Hong Kong's per capita
Gross Domestic Product (hereinafter GDP) had risen to about
$25,300, only slightly below that of the United States, and its
annual GDP growth from 1985-1995 averaged six percent,
approximately double that of the United States. 25 Unemployment
during this same period has averaged under two percent, 2 6 well
below the average in the United States.

22.
See Ho, supra note 20. at 1-16; THE HONG KONG-GUANGDONG LINK,
supra note 20, at 49-59.
23.
See THE BusINEss ENVIRONMENT IN HONG KONG (David G. Lethbridge ed.,
1984).
24.
See ENRIGHT ET AL., supranote 18, at 53.
25.
See HONG KONG: OppoRTuNiTY ASIA, supra note 3, at 1-2: Comment &
Analysts; Statistics;Tables; Forecast BARCLAYS BANK INT'L FIN. OuTiOOK, Aug. 1997,

at 38. For a discussion of the structural changes brought on by economic growth,
see GAVIN PEEBLES, HONG KONG'S ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTORY MACROECONOMIC

ANALYSIS 69-72 (1988). Hong Kong's GDP growth, however, has slowed in recent
years. See FROM COLONY To SAR: HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD 120 (Joseph
Y.S. Cheng & Sonny S.H. Lo eds.. 1995) [hereinafter FROM COLONYTO SAR].
26.
See HONG KONG GoVT INFO. SERV., Statistics, HONG KONG: THE FACTS
(June 1995).
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Hong Kong confronts the same economic problems as other
developed nations, including inflation, underemployment, income
inequality, and adherence to a conservative fiscal policy in the
face of demand for new social programs. 2 7 Nonetheless, Hong
Kong's spectacular economic growth has attracted investment
from around the world. Eighty-five of the top 100 banks in the
world have operations in Hong Kong; more than 750 corporations
have located their regional headquarters in Hong Kong; and over
540 companies are now listed on the Hong Kong stock
exchange. 28 In 1995, total assets and liabilities of the Hong Kong
banking industry were estimated to be over one trillion dollars
and total market capitalization for the 542 public companies
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange was over $300 billion. 29
Hong Kong's service sector today accounts for over eighty-three
percent of its GDP.30 Professional services, including banking,
finance, insurance, management, law, and science and
engineering, constitute an ever-increasing share of the service
sector.
For many years, Hong Kong government policy has been
designed to create a favorable investment climate for business
enterprises. Hong Kong's relatively low personal income tax rate
(currently 15%) and corporate income tax rate (currently 16.5%)
have remained stable for many years. Hong Kong has no capital
gains or sales tax.3 1 Low taxes are a substantial inducement to
business investment. Hong Kong has also long followed a
conservative fiscal policy, rarely incurring a deficit between
revenue and spending. This policy has lessened inflationary
pressure in the economy and has freed capital for investment in
the private sector. Finally, Hong Kong has pegged the Hong Kong
dollar to the U.S. dollar at the rate of HK$7.8 to US$1.0. This
dollar peg has remained fixed since 1983, making the Hong Kong

dollar highly stable. 32 This stability, coupled with Hong Kong's
large foreign currency reserves, protects the Hong Kong dollar
against the currency speculation experienced by other countries
in the Far East.

27.
See FROM COLONY TO SAR, supranote 25, at 137-46.
28.
See- HONG KONG: OPPORrUNnIY ASIA, supra note 3, at 5-6; Michael
Enright, Are You Bullish on Hong Kong? YES!, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), June 30,

1997. at 9. Hong Kong's industrial development has also moved "upmarket." See
MANAGING THE NEW HONG KONG ECONOMY 18 (David Mole ed., 1996).

29.
30.
31.

See HONG KONG: OPPORuNNrY ASIA, supranote 3. at 5.
See U.S. AND HONG KONG: SOME IMPORrANr FACTS, supranote 5.
See HONG KONG: OppoRruNny ASIA, supranote 3, at 3. There is some

debate in Hong Kong, however, over the most appropriate investment strategy for
the SAR in the future. See FROM COLONY TO SAR, supranote 25, at 127.
32.
For a discussion of the linked exchange rate and macroeconomic
policy, see MANAGING THE NEW HONG KONG ECONOMY, supranote 28, at 54-75.
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Hong Kong's laws are also designed to encourage investment.
As part of the reunification process, Hong Kong was required to
undertake massive revisions of its domestic laws to assure their

compliance with the provisions of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China
(hereinafter Basic Law).3 3 Hong Kong's new laws continue to
protect investor interests and, in some cases, expand investor
rights. Intellectual property rights were particularly important in
Hong Kong's law reform efforts. Hong Kong has adopted new laws
governing patents, copyrights, trademarks, and integrated
circuits, and is now in full compliance with the requirements of
the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement of
the World Trade Organization (hereinafter WTO). 34
The
strengthening of Hong Kong's intellectual property laws will
encourage investment in technology-related fields such as
research, development, testing, and advanced manufacturing.
Hong Kong's rich pool of professional workers is built upon
an excellent educational system. About one quarter of Hong
Kong's young people receive a university degree, with engineering,
information technology, computer science, and management the
most popular majors. There are seven government-financed
universities in Hong Kong, with a total enrollment of over seventy
thousand students. 3 5 Hong Kong funds two technical colleges
and seven technical institutes, which enroll over seventy
thousand students. Public spending on education is backed by a
deep cultural tradition that prizes education for the opportunities
it brings. 3 6 Education is serious business in Hong Kong, and all
parents work to see that their children attend the best schools
and receive the best grades.
Hong Kong has also invested in its physical infrastructure to

support its service economy. 37 Hong Kong has developed a state-

33.
See Henry Alan Adcock, Localization and Adaptation of Laws in Hong
Kong (1996) (unpublished report on file with United States-China Business
Council, Hong Kong Office).
34.
See Peter KF. Cheung, Hong Kong Copyright- Policy, Low, & Public Education

(visited Feb. 7, 1997) <http://www.houston.comhk/hkgpd/midem.html>; Peter K.F.
Cheung, Intellectual Property in Hong Kong (unpublished report on file at Hong Kong
Intellectual Property Department).
35.
See HONG KONG GoV'T INFO. SERV., Genera Summary, HONG KONG: THE
FACTS (Sept. 1995).
36.
In 1990-1991, Hong Kong spent 15% of its total government

expenditures on education, ranking second to South Korea, but ahead of Japan,
Singapore and Taiwan. However, Hong Kong's educational spending as a percent
of GDP is 2.4%, which ranks it behind Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. Hong

Kong also does not spend as much on Industrial Research as its Asian neighbors.
See MANAGING THE NEw HONG KONG ECONOMY, supra note 28, at 28-29.
37.
See ENRIGHT Er AL., supra note 18, at 86-88. See also HONG KONG:
OPPORTuNnYAsA, supranote 3, at 6-9.
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of-the-art telecommunications system and boasts of more cellular
phones and more miles of fiber optic cable per capita than any
other nation. Hong Kong also has modem sea, road, rail, and air
transportation systems, which are continually improved. The new
Chek Lap Kok airport and connecting bridges (the largest capital
construction project in the history of the world), a new container
terminal and harbor tunnel, and a major new west coast rail line
to China are among the more noteworthy of Hong Kong's current
capital construction projects. This infrastructure investment will
allow for efficient market transactions in Hong Kong over the next
two decades by facilitating the exchange of business information,
enabling the provision of new professional services, and speeding
up the transportation of goods. 38
Finally, Hong Kong enjoys unique advantages of geography
and geology. Hong Kong is situated in the middle of major
shipping routes between East Asia, Europe, and North America.
Hong Kong also occupies a strategic location within China, sitting
on the southeastem edge of the Pearl River estuary, through
which passes over thirty percent of China's foreign trade.
Furthermore, Hong Kong provides container ships one of the
finest natural deep-water harbors in the world (as well as one of
the most modem port facilities). 3 9 In Chinese cosmology, Hong
40
Kong has excellent "feng shui."
As if to emphasize Hong Kong's economic achievements or to
express investor optimism in Hong Kong's economic future, the
economy soared in 1997.
In the period leading up to the
handover of Hong Kong on June 30, 1997, the Hang Seng Index
(the Hong Kong stock exchange equivalent to the Dow Jones
Average) regularly reached new record highs and real estate prices

nearly doubled. 4 1

38.

Hong Kong's explosive economic growth has brought with it a number

of serious environmental challenges.
ECONOMY, supra note 28, at 127-45.

See MANAGING THE NEW HONG KONG

39.
See ENRGHT ErAL., supra note 18, at 86-88.
40.
Feng Shut (pronounced "fung shoy") Is based on ancient Chinese
principles of geomancy which seek to establish a desired harmony between all
things In nature. Within this system of relationships, some are favored and some
are disfavored. Earth, sky, wind, water, magnetism and energy are consulted to
determine the preferred location, shape, arrangement and orientation of objects.
Although feng shui might seem a strange and inexact art, in China a feng shul
expert is consulted before construction of every building.
41.
See Two Systems, Single Prosperity, BERHAD Bus. TWIES, July 1, 1997,
at 4.
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D. Hong Kong-ChinaRelations
Hong Kong's economy has become inextricably intertwined
with that of China. 42 Hong Kong is China's largest trading
partner, accounting for approximately one third of China's foreign
exchange earnings. 43

It is estimated that seventy percent of

commercial investment in China today either originates in, or
flows through, Hong Kong. 4 4 Hong Kong direct investment in
45
China by the end of 1995 was estimated to be about $70 billion,
while Chinese direct investment in Hong Kong was estimated to
be about $25 billion, over $20 billion of which was invested in real
estate between 1993 and 1994.46 Eighteen Chinese banks are
registered in Hong Kong, seventeen major Chinese state
enterprises are listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange 4 7 (the socalled "red chip" companies),48 and mainland Chinese companies
have invested heavily in virtually all of Hong Kong's major
49
infrastructure projects.
China is a vast and complex country undergoing profound
political, social, and economic changes. Within China, powerful
forces (represented primarily by party, government, and military
institutions) compete over resources, authority, and policy
objectives.5 0 China's relationship with Hong Kong reflects the
complexity of this process as well as the very different histories of
China and Hong Kong over the past 150 years. Hong Kong's
prosperity and its liberal political and economic institutions have
stood in marked contrast to developments in mainland China for
most of this century.5 1 This disparity has long strained ChinaHong Kong relations, and has posed troublesome questions for

42.

For a dated but comprehensive, discussion of the China-Hong Kong

economic relationship, see CHmNA AND HONG KONG: THE ECONOMIC NExUs (A.J.
Youngson ed., 1983).

43.

See HONG KONG:

OPPORTUNIY AsIA, supra note 3, at 11.

See also

Enright, supra note 28, at 9.
44.
See GREATER CHINA: THE NEXr SUPERPoWER? 3 (David Shambaugh ed.,
1995).
45.
See HONG KONG: OPPORTuNriY ASIA, supra note 3, at 11.
46.
See Skeen, supra note 2, at 190 (citing Matt Miller, China Pours Cash
Into Hong Kong--Down Payment on Future City It Takes Over in '97, SAN DWIGO
UNiON-TRIB., July 25, 1993, at Al).
47.
See HONG KONG: OPPORrUNnlYASIA, supra note 3, at 11.

48.
Mark L. Clifford, Red Chips Risky, Bus. WEEK, June 9, 1997, at 50-51.
"Red chip" companies also include Hong Kong and non-state-owned companies
which have substantial mainland investment
49.
See HONG KONG: OPPORTuNrir ASIA, supra note 3, at 11-12; Ho, supra
note 20, at 230-33.
50.
See MIRON MUSHKAT, THE ECONOMIC FuTURE OF HONG KONG 11 (1990).
51.
These disparities have fueled resentment on the mainland. See THE
HONG KONG-GUANGDONG LINK, supranote 20, at 42.
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the Beijing government. British colonial rule of Hong Kong, of
course, further complicated the China-Hong Kong relationship.
The Sino-British negotiations on the post-reunification status of
Hong Kong, which deteriorated progressively in the months

leading up to the handover, revealed deep differences and
resentments between the parties.
To the credit of both countries, China and Britain were able
to salvage from this difficult situation a set of agreements on
Hong Kong's future political and economic status. 5 2 These
agreements grant Hong Kong broad autonomy, which is, however,
ultimately subject to Chinese sovereignty and the authority of the
National People's Congress (hereinafter NPC) sitting in Beijing.
Accordingly, the question is whether China will abide by the
terms of these agreements and govem Hong Kong in a way that
53
will support its existing public and private institutions.
Many observers have noted that Britain has no effective
recourse in the event China fails to abide by the terms of the
Basic Law: 54 economic pressure on China by Britain alone would
have little impact, and military enforcement is not an option for
Britain. What will motivate China's policy toward Hong Kong in
the end will be China's self-interest in pursuing its external and
intemal national goals. China's overriding extemal goal is to
advance its intemational stature in order to assume an increasing
leadership role in Asia. China's overriding internal goal is to
promote the growth of the economy in order to improve its
citizens' living standards and attract a continuing flow of foreign
investment. China-Hong Kong relations, then, must be analyzed
within the context of China's self-interests and goals.
E. Hong Kong Tomorrow
Milton Friedman has proclaimed Hong Kong as "perhaps the
best example of free trade in the world," and the Heritage
Foundation's 1996 Index of Economic Freedom cited Hong Kong

as "'one of the most accessible markets in the world,' with 'very
few' barriers to imports and 'virtually no barriers to foreign
investors.'"5 5
Hong Kong has unquestionably achieved the
52.
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1511 [hereinafter Basic Law];
Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the

Question of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, P.R.C.-U.K., 23 I.L.M. 1366 [hereinafter
Joint Declaration].

53.
See Ho, supra note 20, at 237-49 (analyzing the Joint Declaration and
forecasting post-reversion problems).
54.
See Skeen, supra note 2, at 186.
55.
See HONG KONG: OppoRuNIrry ASIA, supranote 3, at 1.
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economic conditions necessary to sustain substantial future

growth. The question is whether Hong Kong can preserve its
remarkable economic freedom, and thus continue to grow, while
operating under Chinese sovereignty. How will China treat Hong
Kong in the future? Which Chinese policies will benefit the Hong
Kong economy and which will harm it? What will motivate China
to pursue one policy objective over another?. The discussion
below demonstrates that there is a substantial likelihood of a
mutually productive relationship forming between Hong Kong and
China, and that this relationship should lead to increased
investment opportunities and expanded economic growth
throughout the Southern China region.

III. PosmvE ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES: CHINA'S STAKE IN HONG
KONG'S ECONOMIc FUrURE
Stable environments encourage investment. Instability in a
country's basic social institutions increases investors' risks. In
the face of heightened risks, investors either supply less capital or
demand a higher rate of return. Both of these situations have a
negative effect on a country's economy and on investor confidence
in its future. The stability of Hong Kong's basic social institutions
56
in the future will depend heavily upon Chinese policy initiatives.
Will China be inclined to support Hong Kong's social institutions
and stimulate Hong Kong's further economic growth? What
internal and external considerations will guide China's policy on
Hong Kong? How will China's "one country-two systems" political
arrangement with Hong Kong work in practice?
How are
investors to interpret China's often stated economic goal of
pursuing a "socialist market economy"? These questions are

addressed below in terms of the legal, political, economic, and
foreign policy environments in which the China-Hong Kong
relationship will operate.
A. The Legal Environment
The starting point for any discussion of the legal environment
surrounding China's relationship to Hong Kong is the Basic Law,
under which China has pledged to govern Hong Kong for the next
fifty years. The Basic Law establishes Hong Kong as a Special
Administrative Region (hereinafter Hong Kong SAR) which is
entitled "to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy

56.
See Jasper Becker, JiangHeading Towards Point of No ReturT S. CrNA
MORNING PosT, Aug. 2, 1997. at 19.

714

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

/VoL 30:701

executive, legislative and independent judicial power."5 7 Chapters

5 and 6 of the Basic Law deal specifically with the economic
status of Hong Kong and explicitly set forth the following key
points:
* The Hong Kong SAR is directed to "protect the right of
individuals and legal persons to the acquisition, use, disposal
and inheritance of property."5 8
e The Hong Kong SAR is granted the right to have
independent financial, taxation, and monetary systems. 5 9
* The Hong Kong SAR is granted the right to "use its
financial revenues exclusively for its own purposes" and
expressly exempted from taxation by the Central People's
60
Government.
* The Hong Kong SAR is urged to pursue policies which
promote "free trade and safeguard the free movement of
goods, intangible assets and capital,"6 1 and which also
encourage "investments, technological progress and the
62
development of new industries."
The Basic Law, however, also contains two important
qualifications to Hong Kong's autonomy. First, the NPC Is
granted final authority to interpret the provisions of the Basic
Law. The scope of Hong Kong's autonomy, therefore, is ultimately
dependent upon decisions made in Beijing. Second, although the
Basic Law grants Hong Kong broad economic freedom, it also
commands that Hong Kong operate on a balanced budget. Article
107 of the Basic Law states:
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall follow the
principle of keeping expenditures within the limits of revenues in

drawing up its budget, and strive to achieve fiscal balance, avoid
deficits, and keep the budget commensurate with the growth rate
63
of its gross domestic product.

Again, the NPC has final authority to monitor Hong Kong's fiscal
operations and to approve its annual budget. This authority gives
the NPC considerable de facto power over Hong Kong's budget
process and, ultimately, over Hong Kong's choice of economic

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Basic Law, art. 2.
Id. art. 105.
Id. arts. 106, 110, 111.
Id. art. 106.
IcL art. 115.
Id. art. 118. Specifically, Articles 139 and 140 provide for Hong Kong

to maintain its own intellectual property system and to remain a separate cultural
jurisdiction from the rest of China. See also Hong Kong's Transtion to Chinese
Sovereignty; Legal and Business Issues, US-China Business Council, Oct. 1996, at
20.
63.

Basic Law, art. 107.
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priorities. 6 4 The generality of the language used in the Basic Law
affords China considerable policy discretion in exercising its
ultimate political and budgetary powers. 65
The question is
whether China will opt for policies with regard to Hong Kong that
support the tenets of the Basic Law-political and economic
autonomy for Hong Kong and free trade among Hong Kong,
China, and the world.
There are good reasons to expect that China will abide by the
spirit, as well as the letter, of the Basic Law. 6 6 At their core,
these reasons reflect China's need to establish the legitimacy of
its own laws and legal institutions, both externally and
internally. 6 7 Legitimacy is used here in the sense of respect for,
and trust in, a nation's legal system regardless of disagreement
with substantive provisions of the law.
Externally, legal
legitimacy is important for China to assure the dozens of other
countries with which China has treaty relationships that China
will fairly interpret and fully abide by the terms of its
international agreements. 6 8 China's long sought membership in
the WTO has added to the importance of legal legitimacy as a
policy goal. As a member of the WTO, China will become subject
to a wide range of international obligations, many of which will
require changes in Chinese domestic laws and practices. It is
important for China to persuade the present WTO member states
that it has the competence and commitment to uphold
international laws.
China has a long history of abiding by
international agreements. It adhered to various British treaties
through the most xenophobic Maoist years, despite nonrecognition of these treaties by the P.R.C. government 6 9 and
despite universal P.R.C. claims that these treaties were unjust in
their creation and execution. China will likely seek to affirm this
tradition in its legal relations with Hong Kong.
Legal legitimacy is also important for China in its internal

affairs.

A mere twenty-five years ago, China was a lawless

society, ruled by Red Guard mobs and the personal whims of
young party cadres. 70 The lawlessness of this era was pointedly

64.

See FROM COLONY To SAR, supranote 25, at 146-49.

65.

Article 17 specifically states "the Standing Committee may return any

law In question" that is "not in conformity" with the Basic Law. Basic Law, art.
17.

66.
See BARClAYS BANK INT'L FINANcIAL OUTLOOK, supra note 25, at 38.
67.
See Justin McCurry, Business as Usual in H.K., Seminar Speakers Say,
DAiLYYOMim, July 18, 1997, at 16.
68.
See Larry Yung et al., Risk, Guanxc and 40% Luck. An Interview with
CITIC Pacific ChiefLarry Yung,TME ASIA (nt'l ed.), June 30, 1997, at 22.
69.
See Ho,supra note 20, at 242 (quoting Jao, Y.C., Hong Kong's Future
as a FinanckaCentre, IssuEs & STuDiEs, June 1986, at 121).
70.
See JOHN KING FAmBANK, CHiNA: A NEw HIsToRY 402 (1992).
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evident in the attacks on the legal profession. Lawyers were one
of the most persecuted groups throughout the Cultural

Revolution. As a result of these attacks, China emerged from the
Cultural Revolution7 1 with no laws and with a woeful lack of
competent lawyers.
Against this backdrop, China began to rebuild its legal
system beginning in the early 1980s.
Re-establishing a
functioning legal system was important for both symbolic and
practical reasons. A functioning legal system symbolized a return
to normalcy for the Chinese people and provided the crucial
framework for the new forms of commerce necessary to revitalize
the slumbering economy. The legal reforms that China has
undertaken in the last fifteen years have affected every facet of
Chinese society. In the realm of economic law alone, China has
enacted a plethora of statutes and regulations, governing such
matters as domestic and foreign contracts, foreign direct
investments, business organizations, technology transfers,
intellectual property rights, real estate transactions, banking
operations, and securities markets. Despite persistent U.S.
criticism of the Chinese legal system, arguably no nation in
history has achieved more massive legal reform in so short a time.
China's pride in its evolving legal system, and its appreciation
of the importance of the rule of law in its domestic history and its
future international relations, are likely to motivate China to
abide by a fair and reasonable interpretation of the provisions of
the Basic Law.
B. The PoliticalEnvironment

China also has a significant political stake in the
continuation of Hong Kong's economic prosperity.72
China
understands that the surest way to achieve political authority in
Hong Kong is to expand the Hong Kong economy. The great
majority of Hong Kong citizens accepted long ago the realities of
reunification. As long as this constituency is afforded continued
economic opportunity, there will be few meaningful challenges to
Beijing's governance. The reverse situation, however, could pose
serious problems for China. In the face of a strong economy,
Hong Kong residents are borrowing, and Hong Kong banks are

71.

See Timothy A. Gelatt, Lawyers in China The PastDecade and Beyond,

23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 751, 754 (1991) (discussing the dismantling of China's
legal system during the Cultural Revolution and its subsequent re-structuring
after 1978).
72.
See Tng Chee-hwa sets out vision of economic development, HKSAR
GOVT INFo. CTR., July 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, UK Library, UKTRAN File.
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lending, at record levels, especially in the real estate market. 73 A
major downturn in the economy could precipitate a decline in real
estate prices, which, in turn, could threaten the solvency of many
hundreds of thousands of families, commercial enterprises, and
banks in Hong Kong.7 4 This chain of events would surely
increase Hong Kong's political instability, especially if such a
downturn was blamed on policies emanating from Beijing. China
clearly hopes to avoid this scenario.
China's stake in Hong Kong's future prosperity is also
dictated by its international political aspirations. China would
like to be recognized as an economic superpower in the twentyfirst century and needs positive external perceptions of its
governmental policies and administrative efficiency to achieve this
status. The cornerstone of China's economic policy reforms is the
establishment of SEZs, free market zones in a number of coastal
cities. The ideological contradictions and practical incompatibility
of nurturing market economies within a communist country have
been bridged by China through the concept of a "socialist market
economy."7 5 Like the concept of "one country-two systems," the
concept of a "socialist market economy" has met with skepticism,
especially among Western countries.
China is anxious to
demonstrate the soundness of its economic policies and
institutional arrangements in order to combat these international
reservations. 76 Credibility in these areas is a matter of "face" to
77
China.
Hong Kong poses the toughest test yet to China's hybrid
economic policies. Hong Kong enjoys far more economic freedom
than the mainland SEZs and has a far more developed private
market economy. Beijing officials understand that Hong Kong's
prosperity will be used as a measure to gauge the efficacy of
China's current economic policies and, ultimately, the future
direction of the Chinese economy. These considerations are likely

73.

See Noel Fung, Mainland officoils worry over local bubble economy, S.

CHINA MORNING POSr, May 29,1997, at 3.

74.
75.

Id.
In theory, but not always in practice, China's socialist market economy

is directed by central planning in Beijing but implemented through private market

mechanisms in the special economic zones.
76.
See MUSHKAT, supranote 50, at 122-24.
77.
The Chinese concept of "face" involves doing everything possible to
protect your own reputation and that of your family and friends, and "stoically
accepting the natural and man-made vicissitudes of life." BOYE LAFAYETrE
DEMENTE, CHINESE ETIQUEMTE AND ETincs IN BUSINESS 169 (2d ed. 1994). "Face"
also involves avoiding actions which cause others to lose face thereby promoting

social harmony. Some believe that face is a more powerful motivator of Chinese
behavior than traditional Western concepts such as fairness, efficiency and logic.
See . at 181 (stating that face contributes to business inefficiency and social
harmony).
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to motivate China to play an affirmative role in promoting Hong
Kong's economic development and to avoid actions that could be
78
interpreted as contrary to Hong Kong's economic welfare.
C. The Economic Environment
China's direct financial self-interest in a strong Hong Kong
economy is considerable. 7 9 Hong Kong has long been the engine
of economic growth in the Southern China region and has helped
the explosive development of the SEZs in the Guangdong
Province. 80 The Guangdong SEZs are vitally important to the
overall Chinese economy. Although other regions of China are
also experiencing strong growth, Guangdong will remain a
mainstay of the national economy for decades to come. A brief
look at Guangdong reveals the magnitude of China's financial
8
interest. '
Guangdong,
China's southernmost province,
has a
population of sixty-five million people, seven million more than
Britain, but only six percent of China's total population. 8 2 The
Guangdong economy has grown rapidly over the last fifteen years
and is estimated today to account for over one-third of China's
83
total exports, more than double the export level of six years ago.
Exports, of course, are dearly prized by China because they
generate foreign exchange revenue and reserves. Hong Kong's
investment in Guangdong has been substantial. It Is estimated
that in 1995 over four million workers in Guangdong were
employed by Hong Kong companies.
This workforce was

supported by $28 billion worth of investment in Guangdong
by
8 4

more than fifty-three thousand Hong Kong enterprises.
The three major commercial cities in Guangdong are
Guangzhou (formerly Canton), Shenzhen, and Zhuhai.8 5 Of the
three, Shenzhen, directly across the border from Hong Kong, has

78.
See MUSHKAT, supra note 50, at 112-14, for a more pessimistic set of
views on Hong Kong's political and economic future.
79.
For a discussion of the growing economic relationship between Hong
Kong and China, see FROM COLONYTo SAR, supranote 25, at 117-25.
80.
See Skeen, supranote 2, at 204.
81.
For a good discussion of the history of the Hong Kong-Guangdong
relationship, see THE HONG KONG-GUANGDONG LINK, supranote 20, at 32-92.
82.

See HONG KONG: OPPOruNnY ASIA,'supra note 3, at 12.

83.
Id.
84.
Id. at 14.
85.
Collectively with Hong Kong, these three commercial centers have been
referred to as the "South China Economic Circle," the "Pearl River Delta Economic
Region," and the "Southern China Economic Zone." This Article will refer to them
as 'Southern China.'
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experienced the most dramatic economic growth. 8 6
Deng
Xiaoping was personally responsible for designating Shenzhen as
China's first SEZ, a radical reform initiative which ultimately
altered the course of China's entire economy. In fifteen years,
Shenzhen has changed from a farming village of a few thousand
people 8 7 to a modem metropolis of 3.4 million people. 8 8
Shenzhen's economy has been growing at the astounding rate of
fifteen to twenty percent per year for more than a decade (twentythree percent in 1995).89 Shenzhen's GDP was estimated at 71.5
billion yuan ($8.5 billion) in 1995 and is predicted to reach 143
billion yuan ($17 billion) by the year 2000.90 Its foreign trade
reached $38.7 billion in 1995. 9 1
Shenzhen's economic growth has been fueled by substantial
foreign investment. Between 1979 and 1995, Shenzhen entered
into over seventeen thousand foreign investment agreements
valued at nearly $21.5 billion. At the end of 1995, more than
twelve thousand foreign funded companies were operating in
Shenzhen.
Hong Kong accounted for approximately sixty-six
92
percent of the total foreign investment in Shenzhen.
The future growth of these Southern China SEZs is
unquestionably tied to the performance of the Hong Kong
economy. 9 3 Hong Kong has long provided the Guangdong SEZs,
especially Shenzhen, with a rich pool of financial and human

capital.9 4 In order to continue their substantial economic growth,
these Southern China SEZs will continue to draw from, and be
dependent upon, Hong Kong's extensive capital investment and
professional services. 95 If these resources are diminished because

86.
See Shenzen Plays Hong Kong Game, 33 AsIAN Bus. 50-53 (1997); TE
HONG KONG-GUANGDONG INK, supranote 20, at 68.
87.
See HARRISON E. SAI/SBURY, THE NEW EMPERORS 424 (1992).
88.
SHENZHEN INvEsMENr GUIDE 1996, at 10 (Shenzhen Municipal
Investment Promoting Center). For a discussion of Shenzhen's unique role in the
Guangdong economy, see GREATER CmNA, supranote 44, at 91.
89.
SHENZHEN NvEsmNT GUIDE 1996, supra note 88, at 2. See also
Shenzhen Plays Hong Kong Game, supranote 85.
90.
See SHENZHEN INvE~rNT GUIDE 1996, supranote 88, at 2.
91.
Id.
92.

HONG KONG Gov'T TRADE DEP'T, CHINA AND HONG KONG: SOME IMPORrANT

FAcTS 2 (1996).
93.
See Tung Chee-hwa sets out vision of economic development, supra note
72. The Hong Kong-Guangdong economic interdependence is rooted in the

regional specialization of skills occurring throughout Asia where countries
undergoing a transition from labor-intensive to knowledge-intensive economies
play different roles at different times in the Far East Asia market.
94.
See THE HONG KONG-GUANGDONG LINK, supranote 20, at 80-82.
95.
See Sarah Davison, Strong Economy Underpins Hong Kong '97
Confidence, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, May 21, 1997; THE HONG KONG-GUANGDONG
LINK, supra note 20, at 183-85 (analogizing Hong Kong's relationship with the

Guangdong SEZs to that of the "comprador" with the British trading hongs. The
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of a downturn in the Hong Kong economy, the mainland will feel
96
the consequences.
Although there are indications that the focus of China's
economic development efforts is shifting from Southern China to
other regions, Guangdong, and especially Shenzhen, will continue
to be mainstays of the overall mainland economy for years to
come. To the extent China's national economy is dependent upon
the Guangdong economy, and the Guangdong economy Is
dependent upon Hong Kong, China will have a strong incentive to
promote Hong Kong's future economic growth.
D. The ForeignPolicy Environment

China's stake in Hong Kong is also infused with political
concerns for China's future relations with Taiwan. 9 7
The
reunification of Taiwan with the mainland has long been China's
paramount foreign policy goal.
Unlike Hong Kong, the
reunification of Taiwan is not based so much on territorial claims
as it is on political imperatives. For China, Taiwan represents an
unresolved civil war. Until reunification of Taiwan is achieved,
the specter of two Chinas will continue to haunt Beijing's leaders
and destabilize intra-govemmental relations.
Beijing clearly

understands the connection between the fate of Hong Kong under
Chinese sovereignty and the prospects for reunification of

Taiwan. 9 8 Taiwan will be the most interested foreign observer of
Hong Kong in the post-handover period, and Hong Kong's relative
success or failure will surely affect Taiwanese public opinion on
the wisdom of rejoining the mainland. This is not to suggest that
Hong Kong's economic success will lead easily or inevitably to the
reunification of Taiwan with the mainland; it does mean, however,
that Hong Kong's continued success would significantly improve
prospects for reunification and that its failure would definitely
make reunification more difficult.
The reunification of Taiwan will be a far more challenging
undertaking than the reunification of Hong Kong. Taiwan's
political and economic systems are quite different from those of
comprador was the senior Chinese officer in a hong, fluent In the local language
and knowledgeable about local customs.

The comprador often acted as an

intermediary between foreign owned hongs and Chinese businesses).
96.
Of course, the professional exchange between Hong Kong and China is
two-way, and Hong Kong can benefit from Chinese professional expertise In a
number of areas. For example, China is more advanced than Hong Kong in
industrial research and development because of China's expansive industrial
base. See Ho, supra note 20, at 236.
97.
See A Report on China's Economic Future (CNN broadcast, Aug. 7,
1997); MUS-IKAT, supranote 50, at 82.
98.
See Ho, supra note 20, at 243 (suggesting the possibility that a
successful reversion would lead to the reunification of Taiwan).
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Hong Kong and would require a unique set of governmental
arrangements to be embraced within China's government
structure. If China mismanages Hong Kong, many will doubt
China's competence to manage the more complex Taiwan
reunification, and reunification discussions would be more
difficult. This outcome would retard the accomplishment of
China's most prized foreign policy objective-the return of Taiwan
to the motherland. It would also perpetuate the Chinese status
quo, an unstable situation fraught with political and military
uncertainty, and postpone closure of the most important chapter
in China's modem history.
China's need to demonstrate the success of a reunified Hong
Kong to promote the prospects of a reunified Taiwan gives China a
powerful incentive to do whatever is reasonable to advance Hong
Kong's economic well-being. 99 Parallels are already apparent
between China's past relationship with Hong Kong and its
evolving relationship with Taiwan. The formal governmental
relationship now established between Hong Kong and China was
preceded by nearly two decades of increasing cross-border
investment. Economic integration set the stage for political
reunification. A similar pattern is evident today with respect to
China and Taiwan. Trade and investment between the two have
grown steadily over the last ten years, and Fujian Province, a
coastal province directly across the Straits from Taiwan, has
become one of China's most rapidly growing SEZs.10 0 The
increasing commercial interaction between China and Taiwan
bodes well for a successful reconciliation of the two entities. 101
IV. NEGATiVE DEVELOPMENTS: WHAT COULD Go WRONG
Despite environmental circumstances which appear to incline
China toward favorable, if not preferential, treatment of Hong
Kong, other potential developments could adversely affect the
Hong Kong economy. Some of these developments are beyond
direct national policy control, such as currency fluctuations and
stock market prices, while others are largely subject to the will of
the Chinese government. Developments in the latter group that
could precipitate a downturn in the Hong Kong economy include
potential military and political crises, government corruption,

99.
100.
101.
economic

SeeYee, supranote 2, at 630-31.
See GREATER CmNA, supranote 44, at 90-93.
See A at 31-33 (referring to the evolving China-Hong Kong-Taiwan
relationship as "Greater China").
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and

further

A. Military Developments
The military situation in Asia is complicated by many factors.
First, there are two unresolved civil wars: the Taiwan conflict
discussed above and the conflict on the Korean peninsula.
Second, there is the deep, historic antagonism between China and
Japan, the two rival claimants to superpower status in the region.
Third, there is the relative independence of military forces
throughout Asia, especially the People's Liberation Army
(hereinafter P.L.A.) in China. Finally, there is the evolving foreign
policy of the United States concerning the U.S., role in the region
in particular concerning Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea.
The complex military situation in Asia has generated
divergent viewpoints on the prospects for peaceful coexistence

there, particularly in light of differing interpretations of China's
goals and assessments of China's capabilities. These differing
perceptions of China have been sharpened in recent years by
domestic constituencies within the United States and China, who
view their internal political interests best served through
challenge and confrontation between the two governments. A
pessimistic perspective regarding China is clearly and
thoughtfully set forth in the recent best-seller, The Coming
02
Conflict with China.1
The authors of The Coming Conflict with China, both longterm China watchers, suggest that U.S. and Chinese interests will
inevitably collide as China emerges as a military and economic
power in Asia. They fear an armed conflict could arise between
the United States and China in the event China attempts to
reclaim Taiwan by military force or economic coercion. The
authors portray a China that seeks to rapidly expand its sphere of
influence in Asia through modernization of its armed forces,
assertion of widespread territorial claims, and resort to military
action.
China's military exercises in the Taiwan Straits
immediately preceding the Taiwanese elections are cited as an
example of China's willingness to employ extreme measures In
pursuit of its regional ambitions.10 3 Although the authors provide
a good deal of evidence in support of this negative portrayal of
China, they also acknowledge the practical limitations on China's
regional ambitions.

102. RICHARD BERNSTEIN & Ross MUNRO, THE CoMING CoNFIUCT WITH CHINA
(1997). The following discussion Is drawn generally from this work.
103. See Id. at 153.
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China must continue to expand its economic base not only to
support modernization of its armed forces, but also to improve the
living conditions of its citizens and thus strengthen public
support of the government. If China were to become involved in a
military confrontation in Asia, it would disrupt the domestic
economy by diverting resources from civilian investments, such
as capital
construction
projects
and consumer-goods
manufacturing plants, to military investments, such as longrange air and naval defense systems. This diversion of resources
would retard China's development of critical infrastructure

projects in the areas of transportation, telecommunications, and
energy, all of which are necessary for future economic growth.
Diverting these resources would reduce the current standard of
living for tens of millions of Chinese citizens who have only
recently enjoyed improved living conditions after generations of
economic mismanagement. These domestic risks, combined with
uncertainty regarding the full capability of its military-industrial
complex, serve to constrain China's regional ambitions, to the
extent they do exist.
There is, of course, a more benign perspective of China, often
advanced by business associations representing firms with direct
investments there. This perspective places less emphasis on
China's military ambitions and more on its economic
ambitions.1 0 4 Although criticized for its business bias, this view
has the benefit of being informed by the economic possibilities of
modem China. The pro-investment picture portrays China as a
country offering enormous international business opportunities,
the realization of which require stable political conditions in
Beijing and thus the avoidance of any direct United States-China
conflicts. This view sees the historic economic reforms that China
has undertaken as evidence that Chinese policy is being driven
more by private sector growth than by military expansion. z0 5
Further evidence that economic interests dominate Chinese
public policy is found in the extensive foreign business holdings of
Chinese companies 10 6 and especially the P.L.A. Unlike the U.S.
armed forces, the P.L.A. is largely self-financed through the
operation of an estimated twenty thousand businesses
104. It is noteworthy in this regard that China has never interfered militarily
in Hong Kong in the past, despite provocations and opportunities. See MUSHKAT,
supra note 50, at 83-86.
105. For a table of alternative economic policy positions debated in the
P.R.C., see U at 100.
106. Some of this foreign investment is intended to take advantage of
growth opportunities In neighboring economies, and some is intended for
reinvestment on the mainland. Chinese domestic law favors foreign investment,
over internal investment, thereby encouraging Chinese investors to channel funds
through foreign-owned enterprises.
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worldwide.' 0 7 Many of these business are based in Southern
China and Hong Kong, giving the P.L.A. a direct stake in the
peace and prosperity of the region. While an army in business
may seem strange from a western perspective and may raise
awkward institutional questions, the arrangement conforms to an
important economic principle: matching the costs and benefits of
alternative actions. An army in business will personally bear the
costs of the economic disruption brought by war and personally
gain from the economic growth made possible by peace.
In the final analysis, however, even if China is inclined to use
military power in pursuit of regional ambitions, Chinese policy
will be significantly
tempered by the possibility of
counterproductive outcomes. The military exercises in the Straits

of Taiwan had a number of negative consequences for China. The
exercises did little to alter the course of the Taiwanese elections.
They raised new security fears in the region, especially in Japan,
which was pressed into closer military alliance with the United
States. They also drove down the prices on the Taiwan stock
exchange by nearly thirty percent, substantially shrinking the
08
Taiwanese capital available for investment on the mainland.'
Military exercises directed toward Hong Kong would likely
produce similar outcomes. These potentially counterproductive
consequences serve as a strong deterrent to any Chinese military
initiatives.
B. PoliticalDevelopments

Political crises on the mainland or in Hong Kong could also
precipitate an economic downturn.
The volatility of the
relationship between politics and economics was dramatically
illustrated in the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident with a
precipitous decline in foreign investment and trade.1 0 9 Although
this sudden disruption of capital flow was reversed over the next
two years, the event provides a warning regarding the link
between political instability and economic disruption. Future
political crises would likely result in a withdrawal of investment
capital and, more importantly, exodus of professional and

107.

See BERNSTEIN&MUNRO, supranote 102, at 130-31, 144-46.
108. Although the military exercises in the Straits of Taiwan left no doubt
regarding the seriousness of China's intent to reunify with Taiwan, the equally
unequivocal U.S. response might have irrevocably committed the U.S. to coming
to Taiwan's defense in the event of an invasion from the mainland. If China was
sending a message, it paid a high price to do so.

109.

The decline was estimated at a minimum of $7 billion to $8 billion in

tourism alone. See SALISBURY, supra note 87, at 459; TIE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
IN HONG KONG, supra note 23, at 159.
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managerial workers from Hong Kong. About one quarter of Hong
Kong's citizens hold dual passports, and most dual passport
holders are professional and managerial workers. An exodus of
these workers from Hong Kong would depress the Hong Kong
economy and have a negative impact on the Guangdong economy,
especially Shenzhen.1 1 0 This threat to its domestic economy will
steer China's Hong Kong policy toward cooperation and
compromise with the new Hong Kong SAR, and away from direct,
and potentially volatile, political confrontations.
China has limited the scope of Hong Kong's political
freedoms, most notably with respect to activities that support the
Taiwanese independence movement."1 '
These boundaries,
however, are quite broad and afford China a good deal of
flexibility in fashioning solutions to the political problems ahead.
Fortunately for China, Hong Kong does not have a long
tradition of democracy. Although there are a number of party
leaders in Hong Kong advocating further democratic reforms and
individual rights (most notably Martin Lee, head of Hong Kong's
Democratic Party), the majority of Hong Kong citizens are either
apolitical or have only moderate expectations of expanded political
and civil rights. This political indifference is at least partly
explained by the extraordinary growth of the Hong Kong economy
in the absence of any meaningful democratic institutions. Hong
Kong citizens have seen that economic advancement does not
require the full panoply of democratic freedoms enjoyed in the
West.
There is one political freedom, however, that must be
preserved if Hong Kong's economy is to continue to flourish. The
free exchange of business information and ideas is essential to
the operation of a market economy. China must afford Hong

Kong's citizens ample freedom of speech and press to allow for
efficient business communication.
This market imperative
provides a foundation for further freedom of speech and press in
the realm of political affairs and constrains China in any attempt
12
at censorship.
If forced to choose between expanded political and civil rights
and expanded economic opportunity, many of Hong Kong citizens
would likely support the latter. The preference of economic
opportunity over political and civil rights might reflect a
pragmatic assessment of Hong Kong's current status. Economic
opportunity can generate personal wealth, which is seen as more

110.

See Ho, supra note 20, at 103-04. For a contrary look at the so-called

"brain drain" problem, see ENRIGHT ETAL., supranote 18, at 291-92.
111. Tug Chee-hwa sets out vision of economic development supranote 72.
112. See generally FROM COLONY TO SAR, supranote 25 (discussing freedom

of the media in Hong Kong).
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permanent than freedoms provided by government and more
mobile in the event of changes in government policy. Hong Kong
is ultimately about business: its citizens include some of the most

able and creative business leaders in the world. As long as
economic opportunity exists for Hong Kong entrepreneurs, politics
will likely play a subordinate role in Hong Kong society and in
Hong Kong's political relationship with China.
C. Public Corruption

Unlike military or political crises, corruption does not cause a
sudden disruption of economic activity. Corruption weakens
private markets over time as the cumulative effect of government
misconduct distorts competitive incentive and supply and
demand.
In the long term, the negative consequences of
corruption on an economy can be as great as the consequences of
social crises and may be more difficult to remedy. Corruption Is
sometimes claimed to be a culturally relative concept:
one
society's corruption is another's normal business practice. While
there is no doubt an element of truth in this claim, especially in
China where government officials are poorly paid and personal
relationships (guanxO113 are the cornerstone of economic activity,
this does not alter the negative impact of corruption on the
economy.114
Public corruption (theft, bribery, and other illegal conduct by

government officials) misallocates economic resources and creates

inefficiencies in market competition. It also acts as a hidden tax
system in which neither the taxpayer nor the tax collector Is
known or accountable." 5 Corruption biases official decisions in
favor of personal interests. The public welfare, expressed through
consumer and investor demand, is thwarted when goods and
services are allocated on the basis of individual or institutional
self-interest.
Corruption can also serve to reward the less

113. Guanxi (pronounced "gwahn-shee") is the network of personal
connections which governs virtually every facet of Chinese society, both public
and private. See DEMENTE, supra note 77, at 218. Guanxi is the "oil of life" in
China; guanxi is the means by which all transactions are accomplished and the

measure of an Individual's power and wealth. IA. The Chinese spend a great deal
of time and money nurturing personal connections (building guanxO in order to
increase personal prestige and to further professional or business opportunities.

Id. However, guanxiis not synonymous with bribery; it is rooted in deep cultural
conventions having more to do with interpersonal respect and friendship than
with money per se.
114. See McCurry, supranote 67.
115. It is estimated that corruption adds 5 to 10% to the cost of doing
business in China. See Yee, supra note 2, at 642 (citing Maggie Farley, China
Makes Itselfin Hong Kong, LA TIMES, May 2, 1995, at 41).
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efficient, but more influential, firms in a market, thereby
disrupting the competitive equilibrium. When a firm obtains a
government contract or license through the favor of a corrupt
public official, other firms in the market attempting to compete on
the basis of superior quality or price are unfairly disadvantaged
and discouraged from pursuing of enhanced efficiency.
The
corruption tax, like any tax, adds to the cost of doing business,
and this cost is generally passed on to consumers in the form of
higher prices. Unlike official taxes, however, the revenues from
corruption are not reinvested in the economic infrastructure in a
way that benefits the taxpayer or the public at large.
The prospect of rising corruption in Hong Kong government
agencies and the police department is often cited as a potential
threat to Hong Kong's future economic growth. 1 16
Despite
periodic crackdowns and toughening of laws, China continues to

be considered one of the world's more corrupt countries. 1 17 The
Chinese government itself acknowledges the extent of corruption
in its government institutions.
The Supreme People's
Procuratorate (the equivalent to the U.S. Attorney General) is
currently investigating a record number1 18 of corruption cases,
and the Ministry of Finance and State Planning has recently
issued an official public notice ("Notice Concerning the
Strengthening of Supervision and Control of Administrative Fees
Involving Foreign Investment Enterprises") to combat the tide of
false fees being charged to foreign companies.
The Hong Kong government, on the other hand, is
remarkably free of corruption.
This singular feat has been
achieved primarily through the Hong Kong Independent
Commission Against Corruption (hereinafter ICAC), formed in
1974.119 Prior to this time, Hong Kong, like many of its Asian
neighbors, was plagued by public corruption, especially in its
police department. The ICAC has proven extremely effective in
fighting corruption. After ridding Hong Kong of police corruption,
the ICAC focused on corrupt practices in many other areas of
Hong Kong government; today police cases account for a small
fraction of annual prosecutions. 120 The ICAC is widely credited

116. Christine Chan, Economic FutureAssured; Focus on One Country Seen
as Vital as Strong Growth Continues,S. CHINA MORNiNG POST, July 2, 1997, at 2.
117.
See Khanna, supra note 9, at 2.
118.
See Rot All Over: Corruptioncuts into the party'sgrassrootssupport,FAR

E. ECON. REv., Oct. 2, 1997, at 21.

See also Helena Kolenda, One Party, 71W

Systems: Corruptionin the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control 1 4
J. CHIESE L. 187 (1990).
119. SeeWELSH, supra note 11, at 492.
120. Id. at 493.
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for dramatically reducing corruption in Hong Kong, and the Basic
12 1
Law recognizes its importance.
Article 57 of the Basic Law reads: "A Commission Against
Corruption shall be established in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. It shall function independently and be
accountable to the Chief Executive."' 22 Although Article 57 does
not expressly provide for the continuation of the current ICAC, it
clearly envisions a commission having substantially similar
autonomy and authority. 12 3 There is some concern in Hong
Kong, however, over the future power and independence of any
anticorruption commission, especially involving matters that have
a direct impact on Chinese financial interests, such as mainland
companies listed on the Hang Seng Exchange or Hong Kong
companies having substantial mainland investment.
Other

observers expect that the ICAC will continue to function as it did
before reunification because of widespread public support for
anticorruption efforts and investor fears that corruption wil
weaken the Hong Kong economy.
Of all the potential threats to Hong Kong's future prosperity,
corruption is probably the most serious. 124 Fighting corruption
will require commitment and cooperation on both sides of the
Hong Kong SAR border, and the existing ICAC seems to be the
best vehicle through which to channel such efforts. International
investors will closely watch the future of the ICAC or its successor
for signs of weakness indicating a reversal of Hong Kong's
aggressive anticorruption campaign and a resultant regression in
Hong Kong's business customs and climate.
D. Redirectionof Investment Incentives

Another often mentioned, but less serious, threat to Hong
Kong's economy is the development of Shanghai. Shanghai, with
a population of over thirteen million, has long been a center of
industry and commerce. Prior to 1949, Shanghai attracted
significant international investment because of its size, its
location on China's east coast, and its receptiveness to foreign
businesses. Under the Communist Party, Shanghai developed
into a major producer and consumer market, with Shanghainese
goods and management practices reputed to be the best in China.

121.
122.

See ENRIGH-T rAL., supranote 18, at 283-84.
Basic Law, art. 57.

123. See Hong Kong's Transition to Chinese Sovereignty: Legal and Business
Issues, supranote 62.

124. See Davison, supranote 95. Concern is also frequently expressed over
the threat posed by the ascendency of the Chinese Communist Party to Hong
Kong's independent judiciary. See Mus-IAT, supranote 50, at 112.

19971

HONG KONG'S ECONOMICFUTURE

In 1990, the Chinese State Council declared that it would open a
new SEZ in Shanghai-the Pudong New Area. The investment
incentives granted by the central government were enhanced by
preferential policies of the Shanghai government, and today
12 5
Shanghai is the largest and fastest-growing city in China.
Shanghai's explosive growth has been the direct result of
policies adopted in Beijing, more so than of historical
circumstances or geography. The central government continues
to direct investment to Shanghai, and Shanghai's economic
development is a national priority.
Beijing's preferential
treatment of Shanghai can be explained in a number of ways.
Shanghai's development is important to that of China's interior
eastern corridor, a region that has not yet seen much economic
growth. Also, Jiang Zemin, former mayor of Shanghai, and a
number of other senior national leaders are from that city.
Whatever the rationale for Shanghai's preferential treatment,
some worry the result will be the same: Shanghai's economy will
grow at Hong Kong's expense.
However, this concern is likely overstated. Both Shanghai
and Hong Kong will prosper if the overall Chinese economy
continues to grow; both will suffer if it does not. These two
metropolises are not locked in a battle over a static sum of

international investment, but are both

dependent on an

increasing amount of foreign trade for further development.
Shanghai and Hong Kong are also over a thousand miles apart
and serve as hubs for two distinct economic regions of China:
Shanghai for the Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces on China's
central east coast, and Hong Kong for the Guangdong province in
the far south of China. There should be ample economic growth
in each of these regions to stimulate future development of both
12 6
Shanghai and Hong Kong.
Hong Kong also enjoys certain advantages over Shanghai as a
commercial and financial center. Hong Kong is at the center of
the expanding trade throughout Southeast Asia and serves as the
regional headquarters for multinational businesses operating in
Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippines.
Hong Kong also has an enviable economic
infrastructure
including
state-of-the-art
transportation,
communication, and energy facilities. Finally, Hong Kong has an
abundance of technical, managerial, and legal specialists, and a
tradition of quality professional service. For all of these reasons,
it is unlikely that Hong Kong's future economic growth will be
adversely affected by the economic development of Shanghai.

125.
126.

See ENRIGHT ETAL., supranote 18, at 258-64.
See kd at 264-67.
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E. Deteriorationin United States-ChinaRelations

The last threat to Hong Kong's future economy discussed in
this Article is the prospect of further deterioration in United
States-China relations. 12 7 The United States criticism of China
has focused on two areas-trade and human rights. Although
now officially delinked, the relationship between these two policy
concerns continues to be complicated and contentious. Some
argue that trade and human rights are in direct opposition and
that the current U.S. policy emphasis on trade comes directly at
the expense of human rights. Others argue that expanded trade
is the surest path to long-term democratic reforms in China. A
number of groups urge a much tougher trade posture toward
China, whether to rectify the nearly forty billion dollar trade
surplus that China now enjoys, or to punish China for
infringement of U.S. intellectual property rights, or to pressure
China to improve human rights. Still others press for a more
liberal trade policy with China so that U.S. firms, and ultimately
the U.S. economy can benefit from China's development, and so
that U.S. national security interests are served by encouraging
economic growth, and hence political stability, in China.
One point that most observers agree upon, however, is that
economic sanctions are the only means available to the United
States to influence Chinese policy regardless of the subject.
Official government protests, lectures, or criticisms regarding
Chinese policy are either ineffective or countereffective. China's
isolationist past has left it with a great fear of foreign interference
in domestic affairs and a fierce sense of national independence.
The United States would clearly not resort to military power to
challenge Chinese policies or actions involving trade or human
rights. The United States and China have far more to lose than to
gain from a military confrontation in the region and only an
extreme situation could provoke the two into armed conflict.
Economic sanctions, therefore, are the only levers available to the
United States, whether the U.S. objective is trade parity,
intellectual property protection, political reform, or human rights.
Unfortunately, Hong Kong would bear a substantial share of
the direct costs created by any new trade sanctions or restrictions
imposed on China by the United States. Sanctions would harm
Hong Kong investment in Guangdong, limit the flow of Chinese
investment into Hong Kong, depress the Hang Seng Exchange,
reduce commercial activity (especially in the fields of shipping and
manufacturing), and threaten the livelihood of thousands of

127.

See Leon Hadar, Most in US Gloomy about HK's Future: Polls, Bus.

TIMES (Singapore), June 30, 1997, at 7.
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skilled professionals throughout Southern China. It is estimated
that the revocation of Most Favored Nation trading status for
China could cost Hong Kong over fifteen billion dollars in overall
lost trade and could cost the Guangdong economy an additional
four billion to six billion dollars in lost re-exports through Hong
Kong. 12 8 As Hong Kong becomes increasingly integrated into the

Chinese economy, it will become ever more difficult to punish
China without also punishing Hong Kong. United States policy,
therefore, must carefully weigh the negative consequences for
Hong Kong of any economic sanctions imposed on China. It is
clearly not in the best interests of the United States to contribute
to the disruption of the Hong Kong economy. This would alienate
the United States from the foremost free market city in Asia, risk
the loss of U.S. access to its most important gateway to China,
and strain Hong Kong's relationship with China, thus decreasing
political stability on both sides of the border.
United States policy could also trap Hong Kong between its
allegiance to China and its alleged adherence to bilateral and
multilateral international obligations. Under the terms of the
United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992,129 the United States
will continue to deal with Hong Kong as a completely autonomous
area in the realm of trade and economics, and all existing treaties
and international agreements between Hong Kong and the United
States will continue in force. The Act also provides that the
United States will continue to honor its obligations to Hong Kong
under international agreements "so long as Hong Kong
reciprocates," and grants the President the authority to issue an
executive order suspending Hong Kong's independent status from
China.13 0 Given the Act and the existing U.S. accords with Hong
Kong, it would not be difficult for the United States to attempt to
pressure Hong Kong into supporting U.S. trade policy toward
China by insisting that the desired actions are required under
United States-Hong Kong agreements. The United States, for
example, could demand that Hong Kong, as an independent
trading partner, assist the United States through extraordinary
measures to enforce Chinese export quotas or to confiscate
pirated intellectual property. Such a demand would impede
commerce in Hong Kong and place Hong Kong in a potentially

untenable position with respect to China.
The bilateral leverage that the United States has over Hong
Kong on trade and economic matters is further strengthened

128.
See GREATER CHINA, supra note 44, at 90.
129.
United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-383, 106
Stat. 1448 (1992) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-5732 (1994)).
130.
See Skeen, supranote 2, at 203.
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through the U.S. leadership role in the WTO, of which Hong Kong
is a member, but China is not.13 1 The United States could use
Hong Kong's membership in the WTO as a basis to insist upon
Hong Kong's compliance with a range of free trade practices
arguably required by the WTO. The United States could also
enlist the support of other WTO member nations to achieve
desired changes in Hong Kong trade policy. United States
involvement in Hong Kong trade policy is further complicated by
the role that the United States has also assumed with respect to
China within the WTO. The United States has undertaken, in the
name of the WTO, to set the conditions for China's WTO
membership and to be the final arbiter of China's compliance with
these conditions. The United States has assumed significant
responsibilities in trade and economic matters, both in Hong
Kong and China.
These responsibilities carry with them
attendant risks requiring careful attention and analysis. 13 2
In the tripartite relationship among the United States, Hong
Kong, and China, the United States must deal separately with
Hong Kong and China, but recognize that the two are politically
and economically inseparable. United States policy should seek
creative means to aid both Hong Kong and China, in light of the
inevitable changes that Hong Kong will undergo and in light of the
continuing institutional reforms in China. China's one countrytwo systems relationship with Hong Kong will pose ongoing
problems for U.S. trade policy in the region. 133 The United States
will have to distinguish carefully between its dealings with Hong
Kong as an independent trading partner and WTO member and as
an administrative region of China. In either case, however, U.S.
interests would be disserved by the disruption of the Hong Kong
economy.
In the long run, the Hong Kong economy likely will be most
influenced by the overall climate of United States-China relations.
The United States has had difficulty fashioning a positive policy
toward China in the midst of strong domestic protests over
Chinese policies. These protests come from a wide range of

domestic interest groups, including advocates on matters of

human rights, political rights, religious rights, labor rights,
intellectual property rights, and free trade rights. Current United
States-China policy has been designed largely in response to the
goals of these domestic advocacy groups and, as a result, is

131.
China has confirmed Hong Kong's complete and continuing autonomy
in Its external commercial relations after 1997. Id at 195.

132. See Yee, supra note 2. at 633-38 (examining potential problems with
Hong Kong's GATr membership and China's need to Join GATI).
133. See Ho, supra note 20, at 240-49 (noting several versions of postreversion scenarios).
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overwhelmingly critical of China on a wide range of issues. 13 4
Future United States-China policy should shift from criticism of
China to constructive support of China's internal reforms and
international relations. There are a number of ways in which the
U.S.-China relationship could be cast on a more positive footing.
First, the United States could acknowledge the progress that
China has made and focus less on its shortcomings.
This
acknowledgement would strengthen reform efforts in China and
lessen tensions between the two countries. Second, the United
States could work to stabilize commercial relations with China by
awarding China permanent MFN trading status and by endorsing
China's membership in the WTO. Finally, the United States could
defuse the China-Taiwan situation by working openly and actively
with both sides to pursue eventual reunification. China, in turn,
could pledge to continue its economic reforms, open its market to
U.S. goods and services, reduce the trade deficit, and renounce
the use of military force to achieve national objectives. Although
there are many obstacles to a positive rapprochement in United
States-China relations, there is also a great deal to be gained by
both parties, as well as by Hong Kong and other countries
throughout East Asia.

V. CONCLUSION

The discussion above has attempted to set forth the factors
that will most likely influence Hong Kong's future economic
growth and to assess their effects. The author concludes that
Hong Kong continues to offer a highly favorable business

environment for international investors.

This investment

environment is particularly propitious for U.S. businesses for a
number of reasons.
Over time, there will be a correction of the United StatesChina trade imbalance, creating greater investment opportunities
for U.S. businesses. Hong Kong can provide U.S. companies with
a critical gateway to China in order to realize these new
investment opportunities. Many of these new opportunities will
come in the form of investment by small and medium-sized U.S.
companies. This is a business sector in which the United States
excels and which many believe is essential to the next generation
of economic development in Southern China. Also in demand will

134. Many have said this is due to the "doom and gloom" scenarios painted
by visiting politician Martin Lee and his democratic colleagues who have
dominated the American political and media discourse. See Hadar, supra note
127.
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be services that have evolved in the United States to support
small and medium-sized companies, such as venture capital

financing, management consulting, and technology licensing. In
short, the U.S. economy appears to possess precisely the
strengths needed to fuel the next wave of growth in Southern
China, and U.S. small and medium-sized companies appear to be
highly complementary investment partners for Chinese
enterprises.
Moreover, there is a wide range of investment opportunities
available in the Hong Kong-Guangdong region, including
investments in banking and financial services, capital
construction and real estate, and manufacturing and assembly
operations. Some of the industries that are experiencing the
greatest relative growth in the region include telecommunications
equipment and services, computer and information systems,
consumer electronic goods and toys, and clothing and textiles.
Investors can also structure investments in a variety of ways to
accommodate their desired risk exposure. The broad-based
demand for foreign investment in the Hong Kong-Guangdong
region, coupled with the flexible investment options available,
could generate billions of dollars of new business for U.S.
companies.
This Article ends where it began. What matters most in the
final analysis is how Hong Kong compares to other nations as a
location for investment. Is the risk-return calculus for Hong Kong
superior to that offered by other countries around the world? The
answer is yes. Hong Kong will continue to offer a more stable
investment environment than many other countries in Asia,
Eastern Europe, and South America. The strong demand in Hong
Kong for foreign capital and technology will continue to produce
high rates of return on Hong Kong investments. Although a
number of events could derail the future Hong Kong economy, it
currently has a great deal of momentum, and there are no
obvious obstacles on the tracks.
The Hong Kong people have a saying: "No one has ever made
money betting against Hong Kong." This is not the time to try.

